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ON MISJUDGING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, THEIR




Unquestionably, judges misjudge. Even the most arrogant of judges ulti-
mately will concede that all judges err and, at some point, fail to apply gov-
erning law to the facts of the case accurately.' Although all might agree that
judges err, not all judges, lawyers, and scholars agree on how judges should
behave or on what constitutes good judging.2 Not surprisingly, they also disa-
gree about misjudging and the frequency with which it occurs.
In his provocative article Misjudging, Chris Guthrie contends that "mis-
judging is more common, more systematic, and more harmful than the legal
system has fully realized."3 Based on my observations and discussions with
many litigators over the past thirty years,4 I have little doubt that Guthrie is
* Elwood L. Thomas Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law. I would like to thank Peter Joy and Barb Bergman for their
helpful comments. I would also like to thank Brad Thoenen, Cindy Shearrer, and Cheryl
Poelling for their assistance.
I Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007) (describing misjudging as a judicial
failure to reach the "right" result when the law is clear and facts fully developed).
2 Countless books and articles have been written about the proper role of the judge. For a
thoughtful essay by Justice William Brennan reflecting on Justice Cardozo's classic work
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, see William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and
"The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988) (discussing the interplay between
reason and passion in judicial decisionmaking). The remainder of Volume 10 of the CAR-
DOZO LAW REVIEW contains a series of essays exploring Brennan's essay and the nature of
good judging. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10
CAmRozo L. REV. 37 (1988).
3 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 421.
4 My observations about judges and about the workings of the criminal justice system are a
product of over thirty years of working in and writing about the system. I was a public
defender in Milwaukee, Wisconsin for six years, ran criminal defense clinics in Wisconsin
and Oklahoma for almost fifteen years, and was a member of the Terry Nichols defense team
in the Oklahoma City bombing state trial. I also served as Vice Chair of the ABA's Criminal
Justice Section Defense Services Committee and on the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
Board, which oversees the operation of the indigent defense system in Oklahoma. I have
lectured often at seminars and conferences on criminal practices and have spoken with hun-
dreds of lawyers, judges, and criminal justice experts about the delivery of defense services
and the operation of the criminal justice system. Finally, I have supervised interns working
in prosecutors' offices and judicial interns clerking for state and federal judges, practice as a
civil litigator, and worked for a state regulatory agency.
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right. Nonetheless, it also is very likely that many judges would disagree with
Guthrie's conclusion. As Guthrie and his colleagues noted in an earlier article,
"egocentric biases may make it hard for judges to recognize that they can and
do make mistakes." 5
This egocentric or self-serving bias is just one of three cognitive blinders
that Guthrie argues influences judges and causes them to misjudge cases. 6 In
Misjudging, Guthrie presents empirical evidence supporting his claim that these
cognitive blinders, along with attitudinal and informational blinders, increase
the likelihood that judges will reach incorrect results.7 Guthrie concludes,
therefore, that litigants and their lawyers should take the reality of misjudging
into account when deciding which dispute resolution forum to use.
8
As Part I of this Article reveals, I have little quarrel with most of Guthrie's
conclusions in Misjudging. Indeed, in this piece and his earlier work,9 Guthrie
and his colleagues have provided important empirical evidence that tracks my
own observations of how judges behave. That is, all judges bring to the task of
judging their own perspective shaped by their educational background, life
experiences, and legal career. This perspective - together with the blinders
Guthrie describes - consciously and unconsciously influences the decisions
that judges make.' °
Unlike Guthrie, however, I do not think that the vast majority of trial
judges are good or that most "try hard to get it right but are occasionally influ-
enced by their attitudes or deeply held beliefs.""1 Instead of neutral and
detached jurists who fairly and impartially apply the law, a significant number
of judges are "bad judges"' 2 whose strong biases and prejudices usually control
I Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 815 (2001). For
additional support for the claim that judges, like other people, tend to overestimate their own
abilities when evaluating themselves, see Guthrie, supra note 1, at 281-83 (discussing
research that demonstrates that judges' assessments of their own abilities and behavior are
affected by a self-serving bias). See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of
Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 982 (1994) (reporting on a study
that showed that judges were affected by substantial egocentric biases when evaluating their
own behavior).
6 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 420-46.
7 Id. at 423-45.
I ld. at 446-48.
9 Guthrie et al., supra note 5; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
10 Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 784-821. Other commentators draw a similar conclusion.
See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REv. 1213, 1243-50 (2002); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1, 3 (1994).
" Guthrie, supra note 1, at 446, 458. Given the prestige, experience, and tenure of federal
judges, the overall quality of the federal trial bench is superior to their state counterparts.
My assessment is primarily based on my observations of - and articles about - the overall
quality of state trial judges.
12 When Guthrie uses the term "bad judging," he looks to an article by Geoffrey Miller. Id.
at 421 n.8 (quoting from Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 432-33
(2004)). According to Miller,
[m]ost examples of bad judging can be grouped into the following categories: (1) corrupt influ-
ence on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary appointments; (3) abuse of office for personal
[Vol. 7:521
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their decisionmaking. Consequently, I believe it is biased judging, not mis-
judging, that poses a major obstacle to the fair administration of justice.
Although I challenge Guthrie's overly optimistic view of trial judges, we
both agree that judges generally are prone to error because of the informational,
cognitive, and attitudinal blinders Guthrie identifies. If, in addition, I am cor-
rect that a significant number of judges engage in the bad judging that Geoffrey
Miller highlights,' 3 what does this mean for the criminal defendant and her
counsel forced to appear in front of such judges? Simply put, it means trouble.
Unfortunately, for the vast majority of criminal defendants and their lawyers,
the forum selection alternatives that Guthrie discusses are not viable options.
Part II begins, then, by examining the limited options available to the criminal
defendant represented by conscientious defense counsel but saddled with a bad
judge or one prone to misjudging.
As bad as the situation may be for the criminal defendant with an effective
defense lawyer, many other criminal defendants are in even worse shape. Part
II describes the harsh realities of the criminal justice system and explores the
implications of Guthrie's work for those criminal defendants who do not have
access to effective representation. Indeed, far too many criminal defendants are
not afforded competent, zealous representation. As a result, many defendants
lack the ability to meaningfully contest the charges they face and are pressured
to accept a plea bargain regardless of their innocence or the weaknesses in the
government's case.' 4 For many criminal defendants, access to justice is, ulti-
mately, merely an illusion.
gain; (4) incompetence and neglect of duties; (5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal
abuse; (7) bias, prejudice, and insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct reflecting adversely on fit-
ness for office; (9) conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate behavior in a judicial capacity; (11)
lack of candor; and (12) electioneering and purchase of office.
13 For a look at a few of the many sources that document the significant problem of bad
judging, see MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE
ON THE BENCH (1998); CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL SANCTIONS (2002);
Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 629, 677-85 (1972); Miller, supra note 12; Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens
Courts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 7, 2003, at 4; E. R. Shipp, Chicago Court's Politics and Size
Feed Fears Corruption is Endemic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1983, at A14. In addition, a three
part series in the NEW YORK TIMES entitled Broken Bench provides a powerful indictment of
the justice courts that operate in 1250 towns and villages in New York State. See William
Glaberson, Broken Bench: "This is Not America," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at Al; Wil-
liam Glaberson, Broken Bench: "You Learn by Mistakes," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at
Al; William Glaberson, Broken Bench: "Nothing Gets Done, " N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006,
at Al.
14 Rodney J. Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 739, 752-53, 758-63, 779-82, 796-802. For a look at a few of the many articles
that discuss the interplay between the lack of adequate counsel and the pressure on defend-
ants to plead guilty, see ABA Comm. On Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon's Bro-
ken Promise (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/egalservices/sclaid/defender/broken
promises/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter Gideon's Broken Promise]; Geri. L Dreiling, 'Meet-and-
Greet Pleas' Not Good Enough, ABA J. E-REPORT, June 24, 2005, available at http:/www.
abanet.org/joumal/ereport/jn24plead.htm/; Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
931, 952-56 (1983); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial
of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
783, 788-89; Mary Zahn & Jessica McBride, Inequal Justice (Part 1): Poor Often Left
Spring 2007] 523f-
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Yet, despite glaring systemic problems, too few judges are willing to
shoulder their responsibility to ensure that the adversary system functions fairly
and effectively.1 5 This Article concludes by arguing that judges should take
more responsibility for the fair administration of the criminal justice system.
Courts ought not be so tolerant of incompetent defense lawyers or of indigent
defense systems that routinely provide ineffective assistance of counsel. In
addition, courts ought not continue to employ the harmless error doctrine so
expansively, because doing so "increases the likelihood that a conviction will
be preserved despite an error that actually affected the reliability of the trial." 6
Nor should courts turn a blind eye to the persistent problem of prosecutorial
misconduct. Finally, if appellate courts fail to act, then, under some circum-
stances, trial judges must have the courage to act to promote justice in an indi-
vidual case.
I. BIASED JUDGES
In theory, the American criminal justice is an adversarial system that relies
on the clash of advocates to find the truth.17 The trial judge's role in that
system is to ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules are followed, that the
lawyers act in accordance with their responsibilities, and that the defendant's
constitutional rights are safeguarded.18 The judge must be fair, respectful,
impartial, and ultimately, must base all decisions in the case on the particular
facts of that case.' 9 In the end, justice is served if the defendant is convicted or
acquitted based on the evidence presented to the fact finder.
Defenseless in Courtroom, $250 a Month Too Much to Qualify for a Public Defender, MIL-
WAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2002, at Al; Press Release, Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n
[NLADA], Forty Years After Landmark Supreme Court Ruling, Right to Counsel Still
Denied to People Who Can't Afford an Attorney (Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://
www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender-Public/Defender/Defender/Defender-Gideon/Defender
GideonPress..
11 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE,
Standard 6-1.1 (3d ed. 2000); FED. R. EVID. 611(a) advisory committee's note ("The ulti-
mate responsibility for the effective working of the adversary system rests with the judge.").
16 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 653 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a few of
the many articles critical of the Supreme Court's harmless error jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 483 (2000); Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate is Open but the Door is Locked - Habeas
Corpus and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115 (1994); Rex L. Perschbacher &
Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jason M. Solomon, Causing
Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Tri-
als, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053 (2005).
17 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) ("The very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ulti-
mate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." (quoting Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))).
18 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE,
Standards 6-1.1 and 6-1.6 (3d ed. 2000); Mitchell v. State, 136 P.3d 671, 710 ("[t]rial judges
are responsible for protecting and upholding the honor, dignity, and integrity of the proceed-
ings held before them").
19 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE,
Standard 6-1.1 and Commentary (3d ed. 2000); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 9.01, at 231 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that "[an impartial
[Vol. 7:521
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Like many students, I entered law school with a naive view that judges
were generally men and women of even temper, great intellect, and wise judg-
ment who discharged their responsibilities in an evenhanded, detached manner.
The more I read, however, the more my perspective began to change. Working
in a clinic during my third year of law school, in which we defended people
charged with municipal ordinance violations, it became readily apparent that
few judges measured up to my lofty expectations. I witnessed curious rulings,
short tempers, and judgments that seemed totally at odds with the law or my
sense of what justice required. It was not until my first bench trial that year,
however, that I experienced the full impact of judicial bias.
My client was a marginally competent young man who walked into the
city clerk's office barefoot and wearing a cowboy hat. He announced loudly
that he intended to run for President of the United States and, pointing to the
portrait of Richard Nixon hanging on the wall, proclaimed that Nixon should be
jailed. When he continued to insist loudly that he needed to file his nomination
papers, one of the clerks called the police, who arrived quickly and promptly
arrested my client for disorderly conduct.
Together with my supervising attorney, I tried to convince the city prose-
cutor to drop the charge, especially since my indigent client had already spent
some time in custody before being released. When the prosecutor refused to
budge, our client insisted on a trial before the county judge.2 ° I was delighted
to go to trial because I was convinced we had a sure winner. Although it may
be that my assessment was colored by inexperience and my own blinders,2 1 the
law was clearly on our side. My client was not guilty of disorderly conduct
because he had not engaged in any threatening or disruptive conduct but had
only spoken loudly.2 2 I expected, therefore, that my client would be acquitted
and his right to free speech vindicated.
Sadly, I was wrong. After hearing the witnesses, Judge Archie Simonson
ruled quickly, finding my client guilty. Even worse, he proceeded to chastise
my client for his "weird" appearance and then angrily ordered him to leave
town on the next bus and not return.2 3 Judge Simonson not only misjudged the
judge is an essential component of an adversary system, providing a necessary counterpoise
to partisan advocates").
20 For a municipal ordinance violation, the defendant did not have a right to a jury trial but
only a bench trial.
21 See Guthrie, supra note 1, at 437 (noting that lawyers suffer from self-serving biases that
might cause them to overestimate their own case and abilities).
22 The Madison ordinance tracked the language of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.01 (West 2000).
Case law in Wisconsin at the time clearly required more than loud speech to support a
disorderly conduct conviction. See State v. Werstein, 211 N.W.2d 437, 440-41 (Wis. 1973)
(mere exercise of one's right of freedom of speech, albeit offensive to the listener, does not
constitute disorderly conduct absent conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance);
State v. Becker, 188 N.W.2d 449 (Wis. 1971) (defendant's loud yelling was insufficient
under the circumstances to support a conviction for disorderly conduct).
23 During the testimony, the judge heard that my client had only recently moved to Madison
from another state.
Spring 2007]
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case - reached a wrong result by failing to apply clear law to the facts24 - but
he also engaged in "bad judging. 2 5
Fortunately, we were able to appeal Judge Simonson's ruling to a circuit
court judge. In a written decision, that judge corrected the misjudgment, find-
ing that my client had not engaged in any conduct that fell within the reach of
the ordinance, but that he was merely exercising his constitutional right to free
speech. Accordingly, the guilty verdict was overturned and my client
vindicated.26
It was not clear then and it is certainly not clear now exactly why Judge
Simonson failed to apply clear law properly. In his article, Guthrie suggests
that judges possess informational, cognitive, and attitudinal blinders that
increase the likelihood that they will err.2 7 By informational blinders, Guthrie
means those obstacles to clear judgment that prevent judges and jurors from
deliberately disregarding damaging but inadmissible evidence.2 8 In other
words, although the law insists that certain information not be given any weight
in a decision, Guthrie's research confirms that judges do not always ignore
inadmissible information but instead may be affected by that information in
rendering their decisions.29
Similarly, Guthrie reports on research on three cognitive blinders -
anchoring, hindsight bias, and self-serving bias - that may influence judicial
decisionmaking.3 ° Anchoring is a heuristic that causes people making a
numerical estimate to rely too heavily on the initial value available to them.3 1
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency of people looking back at events to over-
estimate the predictability of those events given their current knowledge.3 2
Self-serving bias reflects the tendency of people routinely to make inflated
judgments about themselves, their abilities, or their beliefs.3 3 Guthrie's
research shows that judges are influenced by all three of these cognitive
blinders.3 4
Finally, by attitudinal blinders, Guthrie means that judges possess a set of
beliefs or opinions that predispose them to rule in accordance with those beliefs
or opinions. 35 According to attitudinal theorists, judges consciously make rul-
ings to promote their policy preferences and attitudes so that judicial decisions
24 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 420.
25 According to Miller, overstepping of authority and interpersonal abuse are two categories
of bad judging. See supra note 12. In addition, Simonson's ruling may have been dictated
by his personal biases, which also characterizes bad judging. Id.
26 Judge Simonson later made some inflammatory comments about the provocative dress of
a rape victim and about sexually permissive behavior that provoked a firestorm of publicity
and, ultimately, his removal from office in a recall election. For a look at this controversy,
see Simonson v. United Press International, Inc., 654 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981).
27 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 421-36. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About
Risk?, 1 AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 26, 29 (1999).
28 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 422-23.
29 Id. at 423-25.
30 Id. at 429-40.
31 Id. at 430.
32 Id. at 434.
33 Id. at 436-37.
34 Id. at 430-40.
31 Id. at 440.
[Vol. 7:521
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primarily reflect the politics and opinions of that judge.3 6 According to Guth-
rie, however, judges tend to be blinded more by their attitudes rather than by a
desire purposely to push a particular political agenda.3 7 Nonetheless, Guthrie
concludes that regardless of whether his assumption or that of the attitudinalists
is correct, "judicial attitudes can lead to misjudging. 3 8
Given his comments about the defendant's appearance and his obvious
disdain for the defendant, Judge Simonson's flawed decision seemingly reflects
some strongly held opinions - his attitudinal biases. Perhaps Simonson
believed that the defendant's bizarre appearance and behavior were sufficiently
bothersome that he warranted punishment regardless of the language of the
statute. Perhaps he thought being tough on petty crime would send a positive
message to the police and to the community. 39 Perhaps he felt he could bully a
marginally competent, unemployed street person into leaving town, thereby
saving Madison taxpayers money. Perhaps he was simply angry at having to
spend several hours in an ordinance trial and wished to teach our client and our
clinic a lesson for wasting his time. Whatever drove his decision, Simonson's
guilty finding was surely not the product of a careful, impartial application of
existing law in light of the facts of the case.
Using Guthrie's definition, Simonson misjudged because he failed to
apply governing law to the facts of the case accurately.4n Guthrie distinguishes
misjudging from bad judging, which includes a range of behavior from incom-
petence to corruption.4" It is difficult, however, to distinguish the attitudinal
blinders that Guthrie claims causes misjudging from the bias, prejudice, and
insensitivity that he and Miller contend mark bad judging. Certainly I can
imagine cases in which well-intentioned, careful judges reach the wrong out-
come as a result of unconscious attitudinal biases without Guthrie, Miller, or
me characterizing the decisions as the product of bad judging. On the other
hand, I suspect that both Guthrie and Miller would agree with me that Simon-
son was guilty of both misjudging and bad judging. Not only did his biases,
prejudices, and insensitivity lead him to inaccurately apply the law to the facts
of the case, but in an abusive and mean spirited manner he attempted to banish
the defendant from Madison.
Although this was the first time I experienced the wrath of a biased judge
who clearly reached the wrong result apparently because of his attitudinal
biases, it would not be the last. In my years as a public defender, private law-
yer, and clinical teacher, I have encountered many judges seemingly influenced
36 Id. at 440-46. For an extensive look at the attitudinal theory, see, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
(2002).
17 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 436.
38 Id.
39 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his first police commissioner, William Bratton, promoted an
aggressive campaign against minor offenses such as prostitution, public drunkenness, illegal
street-vending, and aggressive begging on the theory that failing to crack down on nuisance
crimes encouraged more serious crimes. See Richard Tomkins, Fix That Broken Window:
New York Has Cut Serious Crime By Tackling Minor Offenses, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 27,
1996, at 10.
40 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 420.
"1 See id. at 447-48.
Spring 2007]
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by the blinders Guthrie describes. Few litigators, for example, would question
Guthrie's conclusion that informational blinders make it difficult even for good
judges to disregard relevant but inadmissible evidence deliberately.4 2 Prosecu-
tors routinely offer inflammatory evidence or present irrelevant but damaging
information in an argument knowing full well that the judge will rule the evi-
dence inadmissible or even berate counsel for the argument. Yet prosecutors
continue to offer such evidence and make such arguments precisely because
they believe that exposing the judge to such information is likely to affect the
judge's rulings or the final sentence.43
Defense lawyers, of course, also attempt to bring inadmissible evidence to
the court's attention; they just have fewer opportunities to do so. I once filed a
motion in limine seeking a ruling that would allow me to offer my client's
favorable polygraph result in the face of settled law holding such evidence
inadmissible. I knew the court would never grant my motion, but I fashioned a
good faith argument for the introduction of the evidence because I strongly
suspected that the judge's attitude toward my client would be more positive
upon hearing this information. In my experience, seasoned litigators recognize
that many judges will be influenced by inadmissible information and act
accordingly.4 4
In addition, Guthrie's research on the effects of cognitive blinders on
judges rings true to my litigator's ear.45 As Guthrie observes, people generally
have a well-documented tendency to overestimate the predictability of a past
event once they learn how that event turned out.46 Guthrie's research shows
that this "hindsight bias" also influences judicial assessments and decisionmak-
ing.47 Such a finding is wholly consistent with my observations of how judges
behave in practice. It is difficult, for example, for a judge ruling on a suppres-
42 Id. at 429. For a further look at informational blinders, including a phenomenon known
as "mental contamination," whereby people who became aware of misleading or inaccurate
information may still unconsciously be affected by that information, see Wistrich, Guthrie,
& Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1260-70. In my view, "bad judges" tend to be so adversely
affected by strong biases, that they only pretend to ignore inadmissible evidence.
" For a thorough examination of the negative effect of exposing judges to inadmissible
evidence during the plea bargaining process and the proposed solution of excluding any
judge who participated in that bargaining from presiding at trial should the defendant reject
all plea bargains, see generally Albert W. Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,
Part 1, 76 COL. L. REV. 1059 (1976).
44 Although some courts and commentators believe that "trial judges often have access to
inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or
disregard it," Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting in part), other judges and scholars question the ability of judges to remain unaf-
fected by inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIvr 50
(1997) (noting that the professional judge has as much trouble ignoring the "tainted informa-
tion" as do "amateur adjudicators"); United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp 154,
156 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (questioning whether a judge exposed to an allegedly involuntary con-
fession would be able to decide the defendant's guilt without being influenced by the confes-
sion). On the other hand, savvy litigators also know that some judges will react very
negatively to the inappropriate use of inadmissible evidence and will carefully weigh that
reaction when deciding whether to bring inadmissible evidence to the judge's attention.
41 See Guthrie, supra note 1, at 429-40.
46 Id. at 434.
47 Id. at 434-36.
[Vol. 7:521
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sion motion challenging a magistrate's probable cause determination in issuing
a search warrant, not to be affected by the fact that the police, acting pursuant
to that warrant, found the drugs right where the anonymous tipster claimed they
would be.4 8 Judges themselves recognize the influence of hindsight bias in
judicial decisionmaking.49 Yet even such awareness does not immunize a
judge from the effects of hindsight bias.5"
Moreover, a judge's ruling on such a suppression motion is likely to be
influenced by attitudinal blinders as well. A significant number of judges pre-
siding in criminal cases were former prosecutors before taking the bench.5 1
Given the highly competitive nature of the adversary system, it is understanda-
ble that judges who are ex-prosecutors might find it difficult to referee disputes
between their former colleagues in the prosecutor's office and their former
adversaries on the defense side.5 2 That is not to say that all judges who are
former prosecutors take a pro-prosecutorial stance or are hostile to criminal
defendants.5 3 I appeared before some excellent judges who were remarkably
fair despite long prosecutorial careers. Nonetheless, a significant number of
judges with prior prosecutorial experience bring a decidedly pro-prosecution
attitude to the bench, and that attitude invariably influences their decisionmak-
ing.54 In front of such a judge, the effects of hindsight bias coupled with a
48 But see Wistrich, Guthrie, & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1313-19 (reporting "surprising"
results suggesting that probable cause determinations are not affected by hindsight bias, but
speculating that more study needed given unexpected nature of those results compared with
other studies showing that hindsight bias affects judges).
49 As Justice Stewart noted, "[a]n arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided
by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less relia-
ble procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be
subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (quoted with approval in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967)). See
also Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213, 293-94 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given that the
note's predictions were faulty in one significant respect, and were corroborated by nothing
except ordinary innocent activity, I must surmise that the Court's evaluation of the warrant's
validity has been colored by subsequent events.").
50 Wistrich, Guthrie, & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 1317.
51 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCE BOOK (2003) available
at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/tl822005.pdf (showing that between 1963-2005,
between 38% and 50% of the Presidential appointees to U.S. District Court judgeships had
prosecutorial experience); Profile of Texas Appellate and Trial Judges (2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2006/jud-branch/6-judge-profile-090106.pdf (show-
ing 47% of district court judges, 67% of the criminal district judges, and 56% of the Court of
Criminal Appeals judges in Texas had prosecutorial experience).
52 See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 796-
814 (1995); Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship Between
Judge and Prosecutor, 79 NEB. L. REV. 251, 268-70 (2000).
51 Perhaps most notably, Chief Justice Earl Warren, praised and criticized as a champion of
criminal defendants' rights, was a long-time prosecutor. See JiM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR
ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE (2006).
51 See Bright & Keenan, supra note 52, at 781-85, 811-13 (commenting on the difficulties
some judges have in relinquishing the prosecutorial role); Flowers, supra note 52, at 265-73
(describing the "team member" mentality that can develop between judge and prosecutor and
the problems associated with such unduly close relationships); Christopher Slobogin, Having
It Both Ways: Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court is "Unfairly" Prosecution-Oriented, 48
FLA. L. REV. 743 (1996) (arguing that a comparison of Supreme Court cases shows that the
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predisposition to accept the testimony and arguments presented by the State
increase the likelihood that the judge will err. Misjudging is particularly likely
if granting a suppression motion will allow a guilty defendant to go free.
Guthrie's work offers solid empirical support to observations about judg-
ing made by Justice Cardozo many years ago and echoed by Justice Brennan
more recently. 55 For Brennan and Cardozo, "judges, like common mortals,
cannot divorce themselves completely from their personal, subjective vision. 56
Judges possess "subconscious loyalties" and respond, like "the rest of man," to
"other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions, and habits and convictions. 57 In other
words, a judge's assessment of facts and interpretations of law inevitably will
be colored by the judge's filtering process, a process shaped by that judge's
vision, accumulated life experiences, and biases.
Absolute impartiality is an unattainable goal, then, because all judges
bring their own perspective and biases with them into the courtroom. 58 All
judicial decisionmaking, therefore, is influenced to some extent by a judge's
biases.59 Nevertheless, most would agree that judicial impartiality is an impor-
tant value that we want to promote as best we can. Thus, while we know
judges will be influenced by their biases, we expect judges to strive to restrain
their personal biases so that their decisions are not dictated or controlled by
their personal prejudices or biases. At some point, a judge's failure to check
his or her biases constitutes bad judging.
Good judging tends to be marked by evenhandedness. In contrast, bad
judging often occurs when the judge's biases do more than just color decision-
making; they dictate the judge's rulings. Admittedly, the line between coloring
and dictating decisions is inexact. Moreover, our line-drawing problem is com-
pounded by the fact that judges may be unaware of their biases.60 A judge may
be honestly struggling to be evenhanded without recognizing that unconscious
biases are affecting his or her rulings.61 Generally, however, good trial judges
focus on the evidence and arguments presented in court and do not allow their
personal prejudices to dictate their decisions.
Misjudging does not acknowledge the overlap between misjudging and
bad judging. Nor does it take on difficult normative questions of when biased
judging becomes bad judging, of the proper role of the judge, or how we ought
Court generally has a pro-government orientation that is so pronounced that it willingly
sacrifices the appearance of fairness to ensure the government wins). In my experience, state
trial judges too often display a similar prosecutorial preference.
" See Brennan, supra note 2, at 3-5 (quoting approvingly from Cardozo's THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) on the role of human experience, emotion, and passion in the
judicial process).
56 Id. at 4.
" BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68, 175 (1921).
58 Debra Lyn Bassett and John Leubsdorf are among many others who have made a similar
observation. See Bassett, supra note 10, at 1232-50; John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging
and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 237-68 (1987).
" See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 667-69
(2005) (discussing the impact of unconscious bias on judicial decisionmaking).
60 Bassett, supra note 10, at 1248-50 (citing considerable research demonstrating that
judges, like other people, often are honestly unaware of their unconscious biases).
61 See Bassett, supra note 59, at 666-69.
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to evaluate judicial performance. As Guthrie indicates, the focus of his article
is only on those cases "where the law is as clear as it can be, and where the
relevant facts have been fully developed. '6 2 Guthrie understandably focuses
on this limited set of cases because it allows him to sidestep normative dis-
agreements and get to the key point he wishes to illuminate. Even in those
cases in which all commentators would concur as to how a judge ought to rule,
judges still tend to get it wrong because of the blinders Guthrie identifies.
If these blinders make it hard for judges to get it right in easy cases, then
these blinders also are likely to make it difficult for judges to get it right in
cases in which the facts are uncertain or the law is unclear. For trial judges,
this is a situation they confront in the vast majority of cases. Guthrie does not
explicitly make this point, but the conclusion follows from his research. Thus,
when a trial judge listens to conflicting testimony in a hearing, the manner in
which the judge processes that testimony and resolves testimonial conflicts will
be influenced by the blinders the judge possesses. Similarly, a trial judge's
application of uncertain law to those conflicting facts is also likely to be
colored by the judge's personal perspective.6 3 Indeed, it may well be that the
more unclear the law or the facts are, the more likely it will be that judge's
decisions will be influenced by the judge's blinders. Although the judge may
not have misjudged, using Guthrie's definition, if the blinders lead him or her
to reach a particular result, the judge may, nonetheless, have gotten it very
wrong.
This, in short, is the crux of the problem. How do we determine in the
particular case if the judge, indeed, got it right or wrong? Judges - and law
professors for that matter - often disagree bitterly among themselves as to the
proper resolution of a particular case even when the facts are relatively clear.
Most of the time, however, the facts are anything but clear. It is often incredi-
bly challenging to make an accurate factual determination in light of the usual
hurdles: incomplete, conflicting testimony about a past event by witnesses with
imperfect memories, different perceptions, and varied motives. Inevitably,
however, a judge's factual determinations will be colored by the conscious and
unconscious blinders or biases that Guthrie and others have described. Thus,
factual disputes only compound the difficulty in identifying the "right" result.
Ultimately, we are likely to view a judge's decision as right or wrong if it
reflects our ideology, policy preferences, and values. 64
In Misjudging, Guthrie asserts that "trial judges seek to make accurate
decisions under the law; according to this view, judges try hard to get it right
but are occasionally influenced by their attitudes or deeply held beliefs."65 He
contrasts his position with that of attitudinal theorists who posit that judges are
62 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 420.
63 See Brennan, supra note 2, at 3-5.
64 I agree with Susanna Sherry that law and politics are not equivalent and that we ought to
be critical of poorly reasoned decisions even though we agree with the result. Suzanna
Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 973 (2005). Nonetheless, in the end, we are
likely to label the decision that reached the result we deem correct as good or right even
though the reasoning supporting that result may be suspect.
65 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 436. Guthrie and his colleagues make the same claim in Inside
the Judicial Mind, but cite only to two articles, one of which was written by a federal judge,
to support their assertion. Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 829.
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"rational actors" who consciously seek to make decisions that further their pol-
icy preferences or attitudes.66 In my view, most judges do not fall neatly into
either camp.
I would agree that good judges try hard to get it right and are adversely
affected by their deeply held attitudinal blinders only occasionally. As Guth-
rie's research shows, however, even these good judges may be unconsciously
affected by blinders. On the other hand, a significant number of judges con-
sciously promote their policy preferences. Too many state court trial judges
have a pro-prosecution bias that not only colors their decisionmaking, but often
controls that decisionmaking. Although such judges may begrudgingly make
the right call in spite of their policy preferences on occasion, frequently their
decisionmaking reflects their predispositions and attitudinal biases.
For many other judges, how hard they struggle to get it right or how often
they act to push a particular agenda or to maximize their policy preferences
depends on the circumstances of the individual case. For these judges, the
decision to grant a suppression motion that will lead to the dismissal of a case
involving a factually guilty defendant not only turns on the merits of a case, but
also on a host of factors, including the seriousness of the case, the lawyers
involved, the defendant's prior record, a pending election, and the amount or
prospect of media coverage. In my experience, a judge may be willing to grant
a suppression motion in a minor drug case, even though it results in a case
being dismissed despite the judge's belief the defendant is guilty, when that
same judge may balk at granting an identical motion in a murder case.67
Regardless of our disagreement on the extent to which judges are affected by
their attitudes, however, both Guthrie and I agree that judicial attitudes
undoubtedly color judicial decisionmaking and may lead to misjudging.68
Finally, my only significant disagreement with Guthrie rests with his con-
clusion that the "vast majority" of the trial bench are good judges and only a
small number might be "bad."'69 Given that Guthrie uses Geoffrey Miller's
categorization of bad judging, which includes everything from corrupt judicial
influence to bias, insensitivity, prejudice, and incompetence, 70 his assessment
of the overall quality of trial judges is unduly optimistic. Not only have I read
too many accounts of "bad" judging,71 but I have experienced firsthand too
66 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 446.
67 See Solomon, supra note 16, at 1066-68 (in a sample of cases analyzing the use of harm-
less error doctrine, the author noted that courts found errors harmless significantly more
often in murder cases than in non-murder cases).
68 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 446.
69 Id. at 458. My more critical assessment of state court judges is shared by many lawyers
from around the country with whom I have talked and echoed by an unnamed Kentucky
prosecutor quoted by Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble,
Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 951
(2004). Describing elected judges in Kentucky and their "very low experience require-
ments," the prosecutor lamented that "[s]ometimes we get a great judge, mostly we get
mediocre judges, sometimes we get absolute lunatics ... ." Id. See also JAMES W. JEANS,
SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY 36 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the tyrannical judge as occurring with
"sufficient frequency").
70 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 421 n.8 (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv.
431, 432-33 (2004)).
71 For a representative sampling, see the sources noted in footnote 13.
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many instances of biased, improper, or incompetent judicial behavior to agree
with such a rosy view.72 In the end, state court judges are, for the most part,
rational actors whose attitudinal biases reflect their self-interest and their back-
grounds. Most are answerable to a tough-on-crime electorate and are often
reluctant, therefore, to make risky political decisions upholding the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants. 73 Guthrie is right to conclude that even
good, well-intentioned judges are subject to blinders that may cause them to
misjudge a case. Unfortunately, his assumption that the vast majority of trial
judges are good is unfounded. 74
II. IMPLICATIONS
Guthrie claims that given the effects of the blinders he discusses, the pros-
pect of misjudging is more widespread than most people suspect. 75 He con-
cludes, therefore, that litigants should take into account the real possibility of
misjudging in deciding what forum to select when resolving a dispute.7 6 More-
over, Guthrie acknowledges that bad judging, electoral concerns, desire for pro-
motion, and other non-legal factors increase the likelihood that a judge will not
accurately apply governing law to the relevant facts.7 7 Consequently, Guthrie
encourages litigants to consider using other alternative dispute resolution fora
instead of the courthouse.7 8
If I am correct - and the situation is even worse than Guthrie assumes
because of his overly optimistic view of judges in general - where does that
leave most criminal defendants? The vast majority of criminal defendants and
72 For example, a Wisconsin state court judge in a suppression hearing involving a police
stop scolded me for referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) - despite its obvious
applicability - because she reminded me, we were in Wisconsin, not Ohio. A different
Wisconsin judge refused to allow me to introduce a photograph solely because I did not have
the photographer present who took the photo even though "there is no requirement that the
photographer be the qualifying witness." THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D. WOLFSON,
TRIAL EVIDENCE 316 (1997). Finally, I had the misfortune to appear a number of times in
front of a mean-spirited judge whose improper behavior included sexually assaulting a secre-
tary from my office in the courthouse elevator. See In re Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d 485 (Wis.
1980) (suspending Judge Seraphim for three years). For an example of the intemperate and
injudicious manner in which Judge Seraphim conducted himself on the bench, see Walberg
v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985).
71 Among the many commentators who have discussed the pressure on elected judges to
avoid being seen as soft-on-crime, see, e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 52; King & Noble,
supra note 69. Even federal judges tend to draw criticism when granting suppression
motions that are perceived as rewarding guilty defendants. Take, for example, the furor that
erupted after Federal District Judge Harold Baer, Jr. granted a suppression motion in a drug
case. See United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Not only did two hundred
members of Congress send a letter to President Clinton asking him to join them in urging
Judge Baer to resign, but presidential candidate Bob Dole publicly called for Baer's
impeachment. Id. at 122-23. Judge Baer subsequently granted the government's motion to
reconsider and reversed his earlier ruling. Id.
7' Guthrie's experiments were not designed to - nor did they - provide any empirical sup-
port for his conclusions about the overall quality of the trial bench.
75 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 421.
76 Id. at 458-59.
77 Id. at 447-48.
78 Id. at 448.
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their lawyers have absolutely no say in the forum selection process. Generally,
it is the prosecutor who decides whether to issue charges and the jurisdiction in
which the case will be heard.79 The criminal defendant, therefore, is forced to
live with the prospect of misjudging. Even worse, a significant number of
criminal defendants are trapped in front of mediocre or "bad" judges whose
attitudinal biases color their evidentiary rulings, factual determinations, and the
sentences they mete out. If, in fact, the number of bad judges is significant,
then the implications for criminal defendants and for the system are frightening.
Assume, for example, that you are a criminal defense lawyer practicing in
Oklahoma County and defending a man accused of sexual molestation of a
child. Although the child victim has positively identified your client as his
attacker, your client insists that he is the victim of a mistaken identification. He
has no prior record and seems quite credible, despite being unable to corrobo-
rate his whereabouts at the time of the offense. Your case has been assigned to
Judge Susan Caswell, a former prosecutor in the Oklahoma County District
Attorney's office, who ran an aggressive election campaign promising to pro-
tect victims' rights vigorously.8 ° Based on her reputation and your prior exper-
iences with Judge Caswell, you believe she is a biased jurist hostile to
79 The prosecutor must comply with certain jurisdictional and procedural requirements to
launch a criminal prosecution but the choice to proceed is the prosecutor's. See, e.g., Ball v.
United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (recognizing broad prosecutorial discretion in charging
decisions). Some states - Maryland, California, Florida, and Massachusetts among others -
have instituted victim-offender mediation programs, but the criminal defendant generally
does not have any ability to initiate the mediation alternative. In jurisdictions that provide
for an alternative dispute resolution process, the use of such a process normally requires the
consent of the prosecutor. See Nancy Hirshman, Mediating Misdemeanors, 7 Disp. RES.
MAG. 12 (2000).
R0 As a result of statements Caswell made during her campaign, a complaint was lodged
against her with the Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints. See Ed Godfrey, Judge
Gavels Down Opponent's Claims, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 19, 1998, at 1. The Oklahoma
Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel subsequently issued an advisory opinion stating that cam-
paign statements expressing an intent to "balance the scales of justice for victims, especially
little children" were not permitted by the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Judicial Ethics
Opinion 1998-15, 86 P.3d 653, 654 (Okla. Jud. Eth. 1998). After Caswell's election, a
defendant in a child abuse case moved for Judge Caswell to recuse herself based on her work
as a prosecutor specializing in child abuse cases and the promises she made in her campaign.
Although Caswell refused to step down, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals ruled that
Caswell should have recused herself from the case because of the positions she took during
her campaign. West v. Caswell, MA-2000-425 (June 30, 2000) (on file with the author).
The court agreed that given the "campaign rhetoric," the facts of the case demonstrate that
"Judge Caswell's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 4, 6. Judge Charles
Chapel in a concurring opinion would have gone farther. He argued that by continuing to
use her campaign ads even after the Ethics Opinion declared her ads improper, she "deliber-
ately violated the Rules by publicly announcing that she would be biased if elected." Id. He
concluded, therefore, because she "had promised to be biased generally in criminal cases, not
just this one, she should be disqualified from all criminal cases." Id. Caswell was later
disqualified from a high profile murder case because she "turned her office into an investiga-
tive arm for the district attorney." Ellis v. Caswell, MA-2000-1022 (Oct. 4, 2000) (Chapel,
J., concurring). As Judge Chapel observed, "[i]ndeed, there are many serious and scary
problems in this record, but the most serious difficulty is that in her zeal to assist the prose-
cution, this judge unilaterally and illegally denied the defendant in this case the benefits of
our adversarial system." Id. For a critical look at Judge Caswell and the justice system in
Oklahoma County, see Glenna Whitley, Oklahoma Railroad, DALLAS OBSERVER, July 21,
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defendants like your client. She will be extremely sympathetic to the victim
and accommodating to her former colleagues in the prosecutor's office.
Initially, any good criminal defense lawyer will conduct a thorough inves-
tigation to try to undermine the prosecution's case and develop facts demon-
strating the defendant's innocence. Counsel will take whatever evidence he or
she uncovers and will present it to the prosecutor if there is a realistic chance of
persuading the prosecutor to drop or reduce the charges. 8' In some cases, espe-
cially misdemeanors or minor felonies, defense counsel may actually be able to
persuade the prosecutor to divert a case from the criminal justice system.82 In
some instances, such diversion does not need the approval of a judge. A good
lawyer may work with the prosecutor, police, social service agencies, and even
the victim or a victim's family to secure a resolution that will divert the case
from the system thereby eliminating or minimizing the influence of a biased
judge.
In the vast majority of cases, however, the seriousness of the charge or the
attitude of the prosecutor will preclude any possibility of diversion outside of
the system. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that this kind of sexual molestation
case would be diverted or dismissed in Oklahoma County absent significant
proof problems. If you have been unable to corroborate an alibi and there is no
exculpatory physical evidence, it also is extremely unlikely that you will be
able to persuade the prosecutor to drop or to reduce the charges. As long as the
prosecutor has sufficient confidence in her case to push it forward, you will be
forced to defend your client in front of a judge you believe is biased against
him.
A criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to a fair, impartial trial in front
of a judge who is not tainted by any personal bias or prejudice against the
defendant.83 Consequently, in Oklahoma, as in other states and the federal sys-
tem, the defendant can file a motion arguing that the assigned judge is biased
and asking that the judge disqualify or recuse herself or himself from the
case.84 Defense counsel could seek to remove Judge Caswell by claiming that
her prior employment with the district attorney's sex crime unit and the views
she expressed publicly in her election campaign demonstrate her bias and
2005, available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/Issues/2005-07-21/news/feature-print.
html.81 in some instances the prosecutor may have demonstrated a complete unwillingness to
dismiss the charges or to offer any significant concessions such that the defense will have no
incentive to prematurely disclose any exculpatory evidence.
82 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-3.8
(3d ed. 1993) (noting that a prosecutor should be familiar with diversion options and should
consider, in appropriate cases, a noncriminal disposition).
83 See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927); Fitzgerald v. State, 972 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
84 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 2, app. 1, Rule 15(b) (West 2007). Although histori-
cally "recusal" and "disqualification" have not been synonymous, in modem practice the
terms are used interchangeably. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION § 1.1, at 5 (1996). In every jurisdiction, the specific
grounds for disqualifying a judge from presiding in a particular case are spelled out by
statute or court rule. These provisions often incorporate language from the ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. For a thorough exploration of the inconsistencies and inade-
quacies of existing disqualification law, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 58.
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inability to sit as a fair, impartial judge in this type of case. 85 Such a genera-
lized attack, however, is unlikely to be successful.86
It is true that the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct87 and provisions
in state and federal law addressing judicial recusal and disqualification
expressly provide that a judge "shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceed-
ing in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned .. .
Although such a broad standard suggests that disqualification would be an
effective remedy against a biased judge, in practice it generally is hard to force
a biased judge off a case.8 9 For the most part, disqualification works best in
cases in which the judge has a familial relationship, financial interest, or prior
involvement in a matter. When the issue is one of the personal bias or
prejudice of a judge, however, the disqualification process tends to be invoked
infrequently and only rarely results in a judge being forced to step aside.90
Not surprisingly, many criminal defense lawyers are reluctant to file a
recusal motion because defense counsel must litigate the recusal motion ini-
tially in front of the judge whose bias counsel is attempting to prove. Filing
such a motion may well provoke even more negative behavior and adverse
rulings from the judge. Thus, defense counsel generally will be hesitant to file
such a motion unless counsel is fairly confident of success in front of another
court. 91 Nor is defense counsel likely to file such a motion just to make a
81 Such a motion was successfully raised in West v. Caswell, MA-2000-425 (June 30, 2000)
(on file with author). In Mitchell v. State, 136 P.3d 671 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006), the
defense brought a similar challenge including the additional facts that Caswell and her
friend, Judy Busch, a prominent victim's right advocate, both attended the wedding of
Busch's daughter to the brother of the victim in the case. Although Judge Caswell declined
to recuse herself, the defendant failed to follow proper procedure and request a "rehearing"
on the recusal motion before the chief judge. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals ultimately found that the "significant and disturbing evidence of bias on the part of
the trial court," especially Caswell's failure to condemn or ameliorate blatant prosecutorial
misconduct, warranted a new resentencing in front of a new judge. Id. at 706-12.
86 See Miller, supra note 12, at 460-62. The Caswell cases represent rare instances in which
an outspoken judge provides unusually strong evidence of her deeply held biases. As John
Leubsdorf wryly observes, "courts occasionally confront a showing of bias too clear for
quibbling" (citing to Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1255 (8th Cir.1984) in which the
judge, speaking to three ministers about a defendant facing a retrial, said that "he intended to
bum the S.O.B."). Leubsdorf, supra note 58, at 243 n.36. Even in that case, Leubsdorf
points out, the trial judge refused to recuse himself and it took one state and three federal
appeals before the case was reversed. Id.
87 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter ABA MODEL JUDICIAL
CODE].
88 See ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE CANON 3E(l); 28 U.S.C. 144, 455 (2000).
89 See Miller, supra note 12, at 460-62; Bassett, supra note 10, at 1235-42.
90 See id. See also JEFFREY M. SHERMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICs § 4.04, at
113 (3d ed. 2000) ("Bias and prejudice are only improper when they are personal .... That
a judge has a general opinion about a legal or social matter that relates to the case before him
or her does not disqualify the judge from presiding over the case."); see, e.g., Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that under the federal recusal or challenge-
for-cause statutes, prior judicial rulings or opinions almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would render a fair judgment "impossible").
91 After the disqualification motion is denied, the defendant can request a "re-hearing" in
front of another judge. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 2, app. 1, Rule 15(b) (2007). If the
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record for appeal. Simply put, the costs of doing so - further alienating an
already hostile judge in this and in other cases - are too high unless there is a
realistic chance of successfully demonstrating judicial bias.92
Additionally, proving judicial bias can be quite difficult. Like most peo-
ple, judges generally see themselves as fair and impartial despite their prefer-
ences.9 3 A judge may be very biased but totally unaware of the extent to which
her biases are affecting her judgment. In other instances, a judge like Susan
Caswell may be very aware of her biases but honestly believes she is entitled to
them and that they do not negatively affect her performance. 94 In either case,
the most biased judges may well be the least likely to voluntarily step down and
most defensive about a recusal motion.9 5
Judge Caswell's open expression of her strong views presents a rare case
where a reviewing court has a clear record on which to rule. Although there are
other pro-prosecution judges who harbor strong views, most will publicly
express their fidelity to principles of neutrality and impartiality. Consequently,
appellate courts usually will presume that a former prosecutor who becomes a
judge will follow her oath of office to judge the cases before her impartially,
without undue regard for her former position or colleagues.9 6 Absent the
intemperate, decidedly pro-victim statements made by Caswell, a pro-prosecu-
tion perspective or strong attitudes about crime and punishment will not be
enough to demonstrate that a judge is unfit to sit in certain types of cases with-
out a more specific showing. Although it may be abundantly obvious to every-
one in the courthouse where a particular judge's loyalties lie, rarely will judges
do enough or say enough to provide a basis for a recusal motion. 97
So, where does that leave counsel in front of a judge like Susan Caswell,
whose prejudices run so deep? In short, you and your client have two odious
choices. Given the aggressive posture generally taken by the Oklahoma
defendant loses that hearing, counsel can pursue a mandamus action in the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals. Id. at Rule 15(c). For a discussion of the reasons counsel generally
will be reluctant to employ the "high-risk strategy" of filing a recusal motion, see Miller,
supra note 12, at 461-62.
92 In rare circumstances, counsel may, by filing a recusal motion, generate positive publicity
or send an effective message that will, in turn, cause a biased judge to temper her behavior.
93 See Bassett, supra note 10, at 1242; Nugent, supra note 10, at 5 ("[J]udges are typically
appalled if their impartiality is drawn into question[;] . . . believ[ing] themselves to be con-
sistently objective, impartial and fair.").
94 See Leubsdorf, supra note 58, at 243-44.
95 See Bassett, supra note 10, at 1243-44; Leubsdorf, supra note 58, at 245.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985) (despite close personal
friendship between trial judge and prosecutor recusal not mandated absent showing of actual
impropriety); In re United States, 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981) (close friendship between
judge and defendant including fact that defendant appointed the judge and judge represented
the defendant years earlier did not overcome presumption that judges should not be
disqualified).
17 Miller, supra note 12, at 461-62. See, e.g., Mann v. Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir.
2000) (due process did not require state trial judge to recuse himself in case involving sexual
abuse of child despite the fact judge himself had been abused as a child because record did
not reveal any statements or actions indicating actual bias and judge's personal history did
not warrant a presumption of bias).
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County District Attorney's Office,9 8 your client will be extended a plea offer
that involves substantial prison time. Thus, he can accept the offer and thereby
avoid the risk of an even longer sentence should he go to trial and lose. By
entering an Alford plea,99 however, he would be agreeing to serve a significant
prison term despite his claim of innocence. 1°°
Alternatively, your client can choose to go to trial. You undoubtedly will
recommend that your client choose a jury trial instead of a bench trial. 1 '
Given Judge Caswell's biases, the likelihood of a guilty verdict in a bench trial
to Judge Caswell is a virtual certainty. Choosing a jury trial does expose your
client to the potential harshness of jury sentencing.102 Nonetheless, if your
client elects to go to trial, he should select a jury trial because it gives him his
best shot at an acquittal despite the risk of a far harsher sentence.
0 3
Helping the client to decide whether to accept a plea bargain or go to trial
is the essence of the counseling role for the criminal defense lawyer. Counsel
must skillfully evaluate the client's options, clearly communicate those choices
to the client, and then assist the client in making the best choice possible under
the circumstances. One of the many difficult aspects of the evaluative process
is predicting the extent to which the trial court's rulings will affect the defen-
dant's chances for success at trial. Trials are always fraught with uncertainty,
and even the best of lawyers struggle to predict what evidence will come in,
how witnesses will perform, and how various arguments will appeal to an
unknown but highly variable group of jurors.
98 See Whitley, supra note 80. For a devastating critique of the Oklahoma County District
Attorney's office and of the operation of the criminal justice system in Oklahoma County,
see MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE (2003).
99 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized the valid-
ity of a guilty plea entered even though the defendant continued to insist he was innocent.
Most state courts permit a defendant to enter a guilty plea while continuing to maintain his or
her innocence in order to take advantage of a plea bargain. See Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The
Alford Plea: A Necessary But Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 IowA L.
REV. 1063, 1067-68 (1987).
io0 In some instances, an Oklahoma defendant might decide to turn down a plea bargain and
plead guilty with both sides free to argue for the appropriate sentence. But see T. Scott
Randall, Pleading Guilty in Arkansas: A Journey Down the Rabbit's Hole, 55 ARK. L. REv.
401, 406-15 (2002) (noting that prosecutors in Arkansas can block a defendant from plead-
ing guilty and insist on trial while prosecutors in all other states are powerless to prevent a
defendant from pleading guilty). In this hypothetical case, however, Judge Caswell would
not have to accept the defendant's Alford plea. Stewart v. State, 568 P.2d 1297 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1997). Nor is it likely that even if she would accept such a plea, she would give a
sentence lower than that recommended by the State.
101 In some states, a defendant's choice to have a bench trial can be vetoed because the
prosecutor has a right to insist on a jury trial. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 391 S.W.2d 835, 837
(Mo. 1965).
1"2 Oklahoma is one of six states in which the jury plays a major role in sentencing. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 926.1 (2000). For a fascinating look at how jury sentencing works in
three states and why jurors often give higher sentences, see King & Noble, supra note 69.
103 It is exceedingly difficult to predict how a jury will react to all of the facts and circum-
stances at a trial. It is quite common, however, for a jury to recommend sentences that are
much higher than that contemplated by a proposed plea bargain and even higher than that
which would have been imposed by a tough, biased judge after a bench trial. For a study
confirming that jurors give higher sentences and discussing the pressure jury sentencing puts
on defendants to plead guilty, see King & Noble, supra note 69.
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Defense counsel's task is complicated by the fact that discovery in crimi-
nal cases generally is quite limited. Given the limited discovery tools available
to most criminal defense lawyers,"° defense counsel often will have only a
summary of the likely testimony of the government's witnesses and little sense
of how those witnesses will testify. Because of the nature in which trial testi-
mony unfolds, a good defense lawyer recognizes that a judge's evidentiary rul-
ings may well be critical and can greatly influence the course of a trial even
without knowing all of the evidentiary issues that might arise. What every
experienced litigator also knows is that a judge's evidentiary rulings may be
influenced by the blinders Guthrie discussed. That is especially so because
evidentiary questions often present themselves without any time for reflection
or research and often without any clear answer. 10 5 In my experience, judges
tend to fall back on their own evidentiary compass to resolve their uncertainty.
If a judge is biased against one party, however, that judge will resolve many, if
not most close evidentiary questions, in favor of the other side. Moreover, the
more biased a judge, the more likely she or he will "misjudge." That is, the
judge will sustain or overrule objections despite clear law to the contrary.
Given that appellate courts rarely overturn convictions based on erroneous evi-
dentiary rulings, 10 6 biased trial judges can exert considerable influence on a
trial with little fear of a reversal.
At first blush, then, it may appear that counsel's evaluative task is some-
what easier when the judge is as biased as Judge Caswell. Given her strong
bias, counsel can expect that she will decide all close questions in favor of the
State. Nevertheless, because testimony develops and evidentiary questions
arise in an almost unlimited number of variations, it is still difficult for counsel
to predict how badly a biased trial judge is going to hurt his or her case or
unfairly help the other side at a particular trial.
It is not just in ruling on evidentiary questions that a biased judge affects
the outcome of a trial. The judge rules on a host of pretrial issues ranging from
discovery disputes and Brady motions1 0 7 to suppression motions. The resolu-
104 RICHARD SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: BAIL TO JAIL 76 (2005) ("[W]hile trial by
ambush is no longer quite the order of the day," criminal discovery is still more limited than
in the civil arena.). Missouri, for example, is one of a handful of states that permits a discov-
ery deposition in criminal cases. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.415 (2000); Mo. S. CT. RULE
25.15 (2000).
105 See Guthrie et al., supra note 5, at 783 (observing that "judges make decisions under
uncertain, time-pressured conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that
sometimes cause illusion of judgment").
106 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Revers-
ible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894-96 (1992) (documenting rare reversal rate for
evidentiary error in federal system); additionally, appellate judges frequently excuse trial
judges' mistakes by finding their errors harmless. See supra note 16.
107 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors are
obligated to provide the defense exculpatory evidence in their possession that is material to
guilt or punishment. Despite a constitutional obligation and an ethical command, MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004), some prosecutors take a very narrow view of this
duty while others chose to ignore it. For a look at a few of the many articles documenting
the failure of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence, see Lissa Griffin, The Correction
of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1254-
55 (2001); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14,
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tion of these issues can have a substantial influence in determining the eventual
outcome of the trial.1" 8 In addition, the judge's demeanor at trial and her atti-
tude toward the parties, the lawyers, and the witnesses are closely observed by
the jurors and can influence the jurors' assessment of the credibility of all of the
trial participants." ° Judges also instruct the jury and control or fail to control
the arguments of counsel. Once again, Guthrie's work suggests that blinders
can unconsciously influence judicial behavior at all stages of the proceedings.
Unquestionably, a bad or biased judge can have a pronounced effect on the
events at trial and, ultimately, on the verdict.
That does not mean that a criminal defendant is powerless in the face of a
biased judge. Although the defendant faces an uphill battle, conscientious
counsel will fight to overcome the adverse effects of a biased judge. Indeed,
the proper operation of our adversarial system of justice depends on defense
lawyers playing the role demanded of them. 1 °
Fortunately, jurors do, for the most part, try to get it right. Sometimes
jurors will sense that a judge is trying too hard for one side and not being
evenhanded. Even though jurors generally accord judges considerable
respect,'1 ' they may react negatively if a judge displays too much favoritism to
1999, § 1, at 1; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to
Win, The Verdict Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, § I, at 1; Bill Moushy, Win At All
Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/win/.
108 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1243 (7th ed. 2004) (noting that trial judges have a significant impact on jury decisions
through their decisions on questions of evidence, procedure, and pretrial issues).
1o9 See Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("It is obvious that
under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and
properly of great weight, and that his [or her] lightest word or intimation is received with
deference, and may prove controlling."); LaDoris H. Cordell & Florence 0. Keller, Pay No
Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68 IND. L. J.
1199, 1207 (1993) ("I no longer wonder about whether or not we judges influence juries, but
rather how much and in what way we influence them."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-1.4 (3d ed. 2000), commen-
tary at 22. For a look at the extent to which a judge's verbal and nonverbal behavior can
unfairly influence the trial process, see Peter David Blanck, Robert Rosenthal, Allen J. Hart
& Frank Bernieri, The Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Framework for Explor-
ing Trial Judges' Behavior, 75 IowA L. REV. 655 (1990); Peter David Blanck, Robert
Rosenthal & LaDoris H. Cordell, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal
Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985).
110 As Justice Powell observed:
In our system a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representative of the
State. The System assumes that adversarial testimony will ultimately advance the public interest
in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on
behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing "the undivided interests of his
client."
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981). For a thorough discussion of defense
counsel's role, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed.
1993).
.I. See United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 646 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that the judge is
"the most authoritative figure in the courtroom"); Cordell & Keller, supra note 109, at 1204
("Judges are, almost universally, held in high esteem and accorded special status."); Arthur
H. Patterson & Nancy L. Neufer, Removing Juror Bias By Applying Psychology to Chal-
lenges for Cause, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 101 (1997) (noting that jurors perceive
the judge as a very high status person).
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one side.' 12 In the end, some criminal defendants will be acquitted at trial
despite the adverse effects of a biased judge." 1 3
In practice, however, our adversarial criminal justice system often fails to
function as it is designed." 4 Sadly for many defendants, especially those who
are indigent or those ineligible for appointed counsel but too poor to retain
competent counsel, the right to counsel is illusory.' 1 5 Without adequate coun-
sel, defendants have no meaningful right to challenge the evidence against
them. For such defendants, the added risk that the judge may err is almost
totally irrelevant. These defendants live in a world of limited information, little
choice, and, ultimately, little justice.1 16
The overwhelming majority of criminal defendants in this country cannot
afford to retain private counsel.' 17 In some jurisdictions, many indigent
defendants are represented by defense lawyers with the skill, time, and
resources to provide their clients effective assistance." 8 Many other states,
however, provide woefully inadequate funding for their indigent defense sys-
tem, so that indigent defendants are routinely served by overworked public
defenders or poorly compensated appointed counsel carrying enormous
112 See Ann Burnett & Diane Badzinski, Judge Nonverbal Communication on Trial: Do
Mock Trial Jurors Notice?, J. OF COMM., 209, 217-18 (2005).
11 Additionally, if the judge's bias is sufficiently blatant, it may constitute reversible error.
See, e.g., State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Mo. 1971) (reversing conviction in which
trial judge, upon hearing the defendant's brother testify that the defendant was with him at
the time the burglary occurred, placed his hands on the sides of his head, shook it negatively,
and then leaned back swiveling his chair 180 degrees).
114 See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995 (2000), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/lieb-
man-part-1.html; JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/a-broken-system-part-ii.htmi; DAVID COLE,
No EQUAL JUSTICE (1998). For an extended discussion of some of the inadequacies of the
criminal justice system and its failure to protect the innocent, see generally Uphoff, supra
note 14.
115 See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 14, at I (stating that a detailed study of indi-
gent defense services in this country "has led to the inescapable conclusion that, forty years
after the Gideon decision, the promise of equal justice for the poor remains unfulfilled in this
country"): Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and
the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 906 (2004) ("[T]here is overwhelming
evidence that defense representation in the United States often is egregiously inadequate.").
For a powerful indictment of the criminal justice system, arguing that there are really two
systems - one for the privileged and another for the less privileged, who also happen to be
disproportionately black - see COLE, supra note 114.
116 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("Without counsel the right to a fair
trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures
his other rights." (citations omitted)). See also Uphoff, supra note 14, at 779-82, 796-802
(detailing how the failure to provide adequate counsel with access to investigative and expert
assistance drives many defendants to plead guilty because they are unable to challenge the
evidence against them at trial).
I17 Nationally, over 80% of felony defendants are indigent and provided counsel at public
expense. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1, 5 (2000).
118 See Uphoff, supra note 14, at 764-67. Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Oregon
have been identified as states that have quality indigent defense programs. Laura Parker, 8
Years in a Louisiana Jail, But He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al.
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caseloads.'l9 Excessive caseloads mean defense lawyers have virtually no time
to conduct legal research, locate and interview witnesses, undertake a factual
investigation, litigate pretrial motions, file briefs, hire experts, or do any of the
tasks necessary to mount an effective defense. In underfunded jurisdictions,
then, defense counsel is often little more than a plea facilitator. Criminal
defendants represented by such lawyers have little choice but to accept the
proffered plea bargain. The defendant can, and sometimes will, insist on going
to trial even though counsel is ill-prepared to do so. That choice is often disas-
trous.' l 0 Realistically, however, the option of going to trial with counsel who
is not ready, willing, and prepared to challenge the government's case is virtu-
ally meaningless.
The situation is equally dire for most of the working poor. Although juris-
dictions vary markedly in how indigency determinations are made, a significant
number of the working poor ultimately will be deemed ineligible for an indi-
gent defender.' 2 ' Many of these defendants eventually end up representing
themselves.' 2 2 Low income defendants who do muster a modest retainer gen-
erally find it exceptionally difficult to locate a capable lawyer willing to devote
the hours necessary to prepare for and to try most serious felony cases. Most of
these defendants - and virtually all of the defendants representing themselves -
are left, therefore, with a bitter choice: accept whatever plea bargain is offered
or go to trial without well-prepared counsel.
In our plea bargaining driven system of justice, many judges push relent-
lessly to move cases along and discourage trials. Defendants are constantly
threatened with much harsher sentences if they insist on going to trial, so few
119 See, e.g., ABA & NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE
CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (1982); LAURENCE A. BENNER, NAT'L LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973): Gideon's Broken Promise,
supra note 14; RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); SPECIAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE
Soc'Y, ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS (1988). In addi-
tion, the Spangenberg Group, a nationally recognized consulting group, has studied the
delivery of indigent defense services in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States.
Many of the group's reports document severe funding problems in the jurisdiction being
evaluated. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004), available at http://www.abanet.orglegalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA]
(finding that Virginia's indigent system is "deeply flawed" and fails to provide many indi-
gent defendants with effective assistance of counsel, and documenting scores of other reports
with similar findings).
20 For a look at a few of the many stories of innocent defendants who went to trial repre-
sented by incompetent or unprepared counsel, see Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept
Defenses Cloud Verdicts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, at 1; BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD
& JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 163-203 (2003); Barry C. Sheck & Sarah L. Tofte,
Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 38-40.
2' See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 14, at 7, 12, 26 (reporting that each year
thousands of accused poor people who cannot afford counsel are, nonetheless, denied indi-
gent representation).
122 See Press Release, supra note 14, at I (estimating that over eleven thousand people
annually in Wisconsin go unrepresented because they have an annual income of more than
$3,000).
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are willing to risk trial given such threats. 123 The pressure on defendants to
plead guilty is particularly intense for the many defendants represented by law-
yers who lack the time or resources to provide effective assistance of counsel.
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of criminal defendants succumb to that pres-
sure and plead guilty.
124
In my view, the attitudinal blinders that many judges possess contribute
significantly to the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Most judges,
especially those with prosecutorial experience, presume that most defendants
are, in fact, guilty, even though some are, in fact, innocent. 125 This presump-
tion of guilt, pro-prosecution perspective not only affects the manner in which
many judges rule on motions, evaluate witnesses, and exercise their discretion,
but it also adversely affects the willingness of many judges to police law
enforcement agents and prosecutors. 126 Judges tolerate sloppy police work
because they do not want to be viewed as micro-managing the police. 127 Judi-
cial reluctance to let the guilty go free has meant a decreased use of the exclu-
sionary rule.'2 8  Similarly, courts are hesitant to dismiss cases because of
Brady violations or take other steps to reign in prosecutorial misconduct. 129
123 The perception among criminal defendants that they will receive a more severe sentence
if they go to trial is almost universal. WILLIAM F. McDONALD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PLEA
BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 100-02 (1985). Indeed, research
indicates that most defendants plead guilty because they fear a harsher sentence should they
go to trial and lose. Id. at 32, 93-107. See also King & Noble, supra note 69, at 895-949;
supra note 13.
124 Ninety-six percent of the defendants who were convicted in federal courts in 2003 pled
guilty or no contest. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Sta-
tistics, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last visited Feb 18, 2007). Fewer than 5% of state
felony cases are resolved by trial. BRIAN OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 44 (2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.
org/D_.Research/csp/2003_Files/2003_Criminal.pdf. For an extended look at the reasons
why innocent defendants plead guilty, see Uphoff, supra note 14.
125 See Alschuler, supra note 43, at 1110 (quoting Alaska Superior Court Judge C. J.
Occhippinti, "[e]ven in the absence of plea bargaining, I know that ninety-nine percent of all
defendants are guilty, but I still give them their fair trials"); David L. Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1973) (acknowledging that most federal
judges had "the belief - rarely articulated, but.., widely held - that most criminal defend-
ants are guilty anyway"). For an excellent discussion of the widespread presumption of guilt
that permeates the criminal justice system, see Daniel Givilber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317,
1326 (1997).
126 See Slobogin, supra note 54, at 743-45. For an example of the judicial reluctance to
curb law enforcement misconduct, see United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980)
(holding that the government's intentional exploitation of the standing doctrine did not war-
rant exclusion of evidence secured by illegal conduct because the defendant's own Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973)
(drastically limiting the use of the supervisory power doctrine to address questionable law
enforcement tactics).
127 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1988). For a further discussion of the
Youngblood case, a case in which police negligence led to the conviction and imprisonment
of an innocent man, see Uphoff, supra note 14, at 767-79, 782-85, 788-90.
128 See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-68 (2006) (holding that a violation of
the knock-and-announce requirement does not trigger the exclusionary rule).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 499 (1983) (holding that supervisory
power doctrine could not be involved to reverse a conviction in order to discipline offending
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Finally, even when courts find error, too many errors are deemed harmless.
The expanded use of harmless error not only allows questionable verdicts to
stand, it does little to discourage misconduct and sloppy practices in the admin-
istration of justice.1 30
Most importantly, judicial attitudinal blinders lead judges to tolerate inept
defense lawyers and preside over trials that bear little resemblance to the adver-
sarial contests purportedly demanded by the Constitution. Ignoring their obli-
gation "of raising on his or her initiative, at all appropriate times and in an
appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a just determina-
tion of the trial,"1 31 too many trial judges sit idly by while defense counsel
makes a mockery of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
132
For too many judges, moving cases through the system is of paramount
concern.
Nor do appellate judges generally jealously safeguard the defendant's
right to adequate representation. As numerous commentators have observed,
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have put little teeth into the
ineffective assistance of counsel standard. 133 Shockingly poor representation
provided by sleeping defense counsel 134 or intoxicated or disbarred lawyers1
35
has passed constitutional muster. Moreover, the many reported cases of shoddy
prosecutors because their conduct was harmless error). Many commentators have high-
lighted the serious systemic problem of prosecutorial misconduct and criticized judicial inat-
tention to the problem; see Alschuler, supra note 13; ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:
THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2006); LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 114; Ste-
phen A. Salzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So Much?,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1538-39 (2000); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Consti-
tutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1991); Steve Weinberg, The Ctr. for
Public Integrity, Anatomy of Misconduct (2003), http://www.publicintegrity.org/pn/default.
aspx?act=sidebarsb&aid=33.
130 See supra note 16.
131 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Standard 6-1.1 (3d ed. 2000).
132 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why
Habeas Corpus Review By Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Con-
stitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1812-13 (2000) (noting that trial judges continued
to appoint Joe Cannon to defend capital murder cases despite his habitual ineptness).
133 Many commentators, including Justice Blackmun, have bemoaned the "impotence" of
the ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259-60 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). For a sampling of the many articles critical of the manner in which courts gener-
ally have handled the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, see COLE, supra note 114, at
76-81 (lamenting the extent to which Strickland and its state equivalents tolerate abysmal
defense lawyering); Matthew J. Fogelman, Justice Asleep is Justice Denied: Why Dozing
Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial,
26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 81 (2002) ("The states have almost uniformly adopted the Strickland
standard ...."); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics
Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1189-90 (2003) (describing Heath v. State, 574 S.E.2d
852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 588 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 2003) as "the rare and welcome excep-
tion" to the usual judicial toleration of deficient defense representation).
134 See, e.g., Editorial, Snoozing Lawyer Ruling Mocks Assistance of Counsel Right, Hous-
TON CHRON., Nov. 2, 2000, at A36 (criticizing the ruling in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d
336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002) (finding lawyer who
admitted sleeping through substantial portion of a capital murder trial effective).
135 See Bright, supra note 14, at 785-86.
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representation are only the tip of a much larger iceberg. Those defendants
whose arms were twisted into a guilty plea by a lawyer who has spent no time
on the defendant's case are in no position to complain about counsel's inade-
quate performance.' 36 In the end, too many defendants receive too little justice
from our criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
In light of the growing number of DNA exonerations, more commentators
are arguing that many of our underfunded state criminal justice systems are
broken and badly in need of reform.' 3 7 Over the past thirty years, a host of
reports have highlighted the crisis in funding for indigent defense services and
documented the abysmal representation provided many criminal defendants.' 38
Yet, reform is difficult in part because every state criminal justice system needs
a significant infusion of new funding. In addition to adequately funding
defense services, more money should be spent to develop well-structured, well-
supervised community sentencing alternatives. Increased funding also is
needed to hire more prosecutors, to retain good police officers, and to improve
the ability of the police to gather, store, and analyze forensic evidence. Those
same dollars, however, are also needed for better roads, schools, and health
care. In tough budget times, state legislators win few votes supporting funding
increases earmarked for the fair operation of the criminal justice system.
If reform is to come, it is more likely to be spurred by the judiciary.
Indeed, some courts have rendered decisions regarding the delivery of indigent
defense services that have forced legislative action.' 39 Some judges have
spearheaded the push for reexamining the justice system and have been recep-
tive to the need for reform.' 40
For the most part, however, the judicial branch has not been diligent
enough in ensuring the fair administration of our criminal justice systems. The
appellate courts have condoned too much incompetent defense lawyering, too
136 For a discussion of the extremely difficult struggle a represented defendant faces in
obtaining relief following a guilty plea, see Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to
the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1821-22
(2000).
137 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 114; Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 14; LIEBMAN ET
AL., supra note 114.
138 See supra notes 14, 119 and accompanying text.
139 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770,
777 (Ark. 1991); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1139
(Fla. 1990); Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (Kan. 1987); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d
780, 791 (La. 1993); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983); State v. Lynch,
796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
140 For example, Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr. of the North Carolina Supreme Court
initiated the discussion that led to the creation of the North Carolina Actual Innocence Com-
mission. See Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission:
Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 648-49
(2004). See also Justice John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Address to the ABA Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva
(Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-06-05.html (not-
ing that there are "serious flaws in our administration of criminal justice").
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much prosecutorial misconduct, and too much overreaching by the police. In
the end, judicial tolerance of so much unacceptable behavior may in part be
influenced by the blinders that Guthrie describes, but may also be a product of
a more limited vision of the judge's role.' Articulating such a vision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should defer to the legislative branch,
which has the "primary responsibility" for making difficult policy choices that
are part of any sentencing scheme.' 4 2 In his view, "[w]e do not sit as a
'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices." 143
Appellate judges cannot continue to be so deferential to the legislative and
executive branches on matters relating to the fair administration of the criminal
justice system. Rather, it is the judiciary that must serve as an "excellent bar-
rier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body."'14 It is
the duty of the co-equal, independent judiciary to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which though they speed-
ily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency,
in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
14 5
Admittedly, declaring a state's system for delivering defense services to
be constitutionally deficient, for example, which in turn forces the state legisla-
ture to allocate millions of dollars of additional funding, may draw the ire of
the other two branches and of the public as well. It requires, however, "an
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardi-
ans of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by
the major voice of the community." '146
The nation's Founders heeded the advice given in The Federalist Papers
and provided for an independent federal judiciary with appointed positions not
subject to the whim and pressures of the electorate.' 47 Elected state appellate
judges are not so fortunate. Appellate judges have been publicly attacked and
voted out of office, not for misjudging or bad judging, but for taking positions
perceived by some as pro-criminal defendant.' 4 8 It is incumbent on the bar of
141 For a vigorous defense of this more limited role, see Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 449-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1997)
(opining that judicial reluctance to impose restraints on the criminal process "seems to have
been motivated by a desire not to trench on the prerogatives of the politicians").
142 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
143 Id.
'44 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
145 Id. at 469.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Richard Carelli, Judge Pays Price of Her Convictions, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 1, 1996, at A44
(reporting that Tennessee Supreme Judge Penny White lost a retention election for voting to
overturn a murderer's death sentence); Abner J. Mikva, Judicial Pest Control, 148 N.J. L.J.
1059 (1997) (observing that Chief Justice Rose Bird of California was denied a second term
by California voters because of her positions in several death penalty cases). For an excel-
lent look at the extent to which political pressures negatively affect the fairness of capital
cases, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 52.
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each state, therefore, to do its best to educate the public about the importance of
an independent judiciary and to promote the value of non-partisan, impartial
judicial decisionmaking.
Given electoral politics and the pro-prosecution perspective of a signifi-
cant numbers of appellate judges, it is hard to be particularly optimistic about
criminal justice reform. Certainly some judges do change dramatically during
their tenure on the bench.14 9 Nonetheless, unless and until more judges recog-
nize the effects of their attitudinal blinders and acknowledge the significant
flaws in our criminal justice system, it is unlikely that we shall see many appel-
late courts taking a more active role in policing the system.
Finally, I have argued that biased judging at the trial level also threatens
the fair operation of our criminal justice system. Indeed, if we are to provide
criminal defendants the fair trial promised them by our Constitution, it is criti-
cal that judges strive to keep their biases in check. As Guthrie's article demon-
strates, that will not be easy. At the same time, we also need more trial judges
to heed the advice given by Justice Brennan in his lecture on judging honoring
Justice Cardozo.' 50 Brennan recognized that the brutality of a criminal case
often threatens to overwhelm even the most "seasoned judge."' 5 1 "Yet the
judge's job is not to yield to the visceral temptation to help prosecute the crimi-
nal, but to preserve the values and guarantees of our system of criminal justice,
whatever the implications in an individual case." '152 Good judges not only
"unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge,"' 53 but they possess
the courage to do what is right regardless of the personal consequences. Doing
what is right may even mean that a good trial judge may purposefully "mis-
judge" in a compelling case. 154
149 See Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress of a Humane Justice: Harry Blackmun's
Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 367, 368 (1995) (describing Justice Black-
mun's transformation to a death penalty opponent). But see Martha J. Dragich, Justice
Blackmun, Franz Kafka, and Capital Punishment, 63 Mo. L. REV. 853 (1998) (arguing that
while Justice Blackmun's position on the death penalty changed over the years his personal
views remained constant).
15o Brennan, supra note 2.
151 Id. at 11.
152 Id.
153 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 144, at 471.
151 In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) and in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003), the Supreme Court declared that enhanced sentences under recidivists statutes were
not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment such that the life sentence in
Rummel and the twenty-five to life sentence in Ewing did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Many judges find themselves, therefore, in the difficult dilemma of having to
impose a life sentence on a defendant for a third conviction involving a minor felony even
though the judge feels that such a sentence is unjust because the defendant's crime does not
warrant such a harsh result. If the judge "misjudges" and refuses to impose the life sentence,
he or she is very likely to be reversed should the state decide to appeal. Arguably, a consci-
entious judge is not engaging in bad judging by failing to follow clear law in such a case, if
she feels justice demands it and clearly sets forth her reasons for her decision. A full discus-
sion of this point is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
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